War-Time Contingency and the Balfour Declaration of 1917

Rejecting deterministic views of the 1917 Balfour Declaration as an expression of the inevitable work of history returning Jews to their ancient homeland, this article argues that Britain's fateful endorsement of the idea of a national home for Jews in Palestine was, in fact, the result of a combination of fortuity and contingency related primarily to World War I and the concerns and personalities of the British politicians involved. The article highlights the historic improbability of the Declaration and its implementation in the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, noting the regression it represented at a time when British imperial policy aspired to more flexible accommodations with colonial populations.

FOR MANY ZIONISTS in the early twentieth century, the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine through the British government’s Balfour Declaration of 1917 and its League of Nations Mandate of 1922 represented, momentously, the now-imminent return of a diasporic people, comparative aliens in gentile societies, to their ancient home in the Levant. The mystic Zionist, Abraham Isaac Kook, saw it all as an expression of divine purpose, a great restorative sweep of God-driven history. Such ideas were rooted, albeit with a political twist, in the ancient Jewish sense of a “sacred” history and a related metaphysic of material events. There was an even grander reclamation: a “return to history” (ha-shiva la-historia) itself. Until that point, lacking territoriality and incoherent as a nation, the Jews had been, in David Ben-Gurion’s words at the time of the Balfour Declaration, “extricated from world history.” Now, through the official agency of the British, they were poised for a dramatic reentry.

REGRESSION

To the disinterested historian, however, what commands attention is not some working through of ineluctable religious or secular historical forces but rather the sheer short-term contingency, much of it war related, of the enabling factors underlying both the Declaration and Britain’s Mandate over Palestine in which it was ultimately incorporated. If there was any great movement of events, it was more a regression than an advance, involving as it did the establishment of a European settler community in an already well-peopled and well-charted territory. Britain’s sponsorship of the Zionist project stood in contradiction to the “Wilsonian” spirit of the times, in which self-determination for formerly imperialized societies had been, notionally at least, a significant concern in post–World War I political dispositions.

The British were remarkably explicit in their denial of democratic rights to the Palestinian Arabs. The author of the Declaration, Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour, insisted, in an oft-quoted remark, that the aspirations of Zionists were “of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land,” and that Arab claims to Palestine were “infinitely weaker than those of the Jews.” These views were consistent with the Declaration’s promise of protection for the “civil and religious,” but not “political,” rights of the so-called “non-Jewish” population of Palestine. Lord Alfred Milner, one of the drafters of the Declaration, suggested that history and tradition of “the most sacred character” made it “impossible . . . to leave it to the Arab majority . . . to decide what shall be the future of Palestine.” The prime minister, David Lloyd George, was more succinct: “You mustn’t give responsible government to Palestine.” Nor could the indigenous population do much by way of effective complaint: Sir Ronald Storrs, successively military governor of Jerusalem and civil governor of Jerusalem and Judea between 1917 and 1926, observed that the Palestinian Arabs, in making pleas for political justice, had “about as much chance as had the Dervishes before Kitchener’s machine guns at Omdurman.”

There was, of course, a widespread failure on the part of European colonial powers to deliver self-determination to their subordinate societies: It took a second world war to bring that about. But there was a distinct sense in British imperial policy that aspired to more flexible accommodations with colonial populations—notably in India, Ireland, and Egypt. Winston Churchill as colonial secretary had, despite his own vigorous Zionism, a clear sense of the inflammatory inconsistency involved, declaring in 1922 that the problem with the idea of a Jewish homeland was “that it conflicted with our regular policy of consulting the wishes of the people in mandate territories and giving them a representative institution as soon as they were fitted for it.” Another friend of Zionism, Sir Mark Sykes, insisted in 1918: “If Arab nationality be recognised in Syria and Mesopotamia as a matter of justice it will be equally necessary to devise some form of control or administration for Palestine” that recognizes “the various religious and racial nationalities in the country . . . according equal privileges to all such nationalities.”

The regression, however, was implemented, and proved to be of the greatest historical significance, with bloody consequences for the near-century ahead. The clear implication was that the Jewish national home in Palestine, inserted in newly conquered British territory, could survive only through radical moderation of its colonialist instincts and an historic compromise with the Arab majority; or, alternatively, by iron-fisted attempts to impose unmoderated Jewish political will. The second approach—the one that came to govern events—was well articulated by the “revisionist” Zionists, most notably by the Odessa-born Vladimir Jabotinsky. As Avi Shlaim indicates, Jabotinsky did not subscribe to the common, tendentious illusion that “backward” Arabs would welcome “modernizing” Jews into their midst. Conflict was bound to ensue, he maintained, and it was incumbent upon the arriving settlers to prepare psychologically and militarily for the battles to come. “Any native people,” Jabotinsky wrote in 1923, “views their country as their national home, of which they are complete masters. They will not voluntarily allow, not even a new master, but even a new partner. And so it is for the Arabs. . . . They look upon Palestine with the same instinctive love and true fervor that any Aztec looked upon his Mexico or a Sioux looked upon the prairie.” The analogies were not happy ones.

http://www.palestine-studies.org/journals.aspx?id=10925&jid=1&href=abstract

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A Beautiful Day of Worship For Palestinians

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Last kaffiyeh factory struggles to stay afloat in Palestinian territories

The kaffiyeh became a symbol of resistance because of its most famous exponent, Yasser Arafat. Its popularity as a fashion item came later. Photograph: AFP

In a rundown office to the side of a gloomy and deserted breeze-block factory, 76-year-old Yasser Hirbawi is hunched on a low couch turning his life's work over and over between his fingers.

In his lap – and on his head – are specimens of what has become the internationally recognised symbol of the Palestinian national struggle, the kaffiyeh, the chequered headscarf worn by politicians and militants alike and adopted not just by their supporters but by fashionistas across the globe.

But the kaffiyeh's ubiquity is of small comfort to Hirbawi, his two sons and the sole employee left in the last factory making the headscarves in the Palestinian territories. After almost 50 years, the family business is struggling to keep afloat amid a flood of cheap Chinese imports.

"The Chinese kaffiyehs are like a cigarette paper," says Jouda Hirbawi, 44. "They are cheaper, but the quality is lower."

According to the Hirbawis, the Chinese manufacturers use polyester and poor-quality cotton in their kaffiyehs. In contrast, a Hirbawi kaffiyeh is laboriously produced with high-quality material and – just as importantly – a sense of history.

But the Chinese products sell at less than two-thirds the price of the Palestinian scarves. "We sell a dozen for 100 shekels (£17). The Chinese sell a dozen for 60 shekels (£10)," says Jouda. "The people who are importing this garbage from China are killing the local product."

Hirbawi Textiles once employed 15 men in the factory, plus perhaps another 25 women finishing the scarves in their homes, between them supporting about 300 people and producing hundreds of kaffiyehs daily. "We were working 17 or 18 hours a day, supplying the local market. It's very intensive and tedious work."

Now one loyal employee is left working alongside the Hirbawi brothers. All but one of the looms was idle today, its clacking echoing around the factory floor. A low-wattage fluorescent strip casts a pool of light over the machine in the factory gloom.

The change in fortunes followed the signing of the Oslo accords in the early 1990s, after which the newly formed Palestinian Authority opened up its market to imports. In 1995, Hirbawi Textiles closed down. "There was no demand," says Jouda. "We shut for five years. Then we said, 'This is the only thing we know how to do', so we decided to try again."

The family is bitter at the PA's refusal to protect Palestinian businesses and what it describes as a "national product".

"There should be high taxes imposed on outside products," says Yasser Hirbawi. "They should not be helping outside products against local products. A falafel stand makes more money than this factory."

He is dismissive of the Palestinian businessmen importing Chinese kaffiyehs. "They are merchants, they just want to make a profit."

The factory's main source of income now is from foreign visitors, without whom "we would have closed a long time ago," says Jouda. "A lot of foreigners wear kaffiyehs to show their support for the Palestinians."

In the factory office, a small boy is rearranging bagged kaffiyehs on banks of shelves awaiting the next group of foreigners to descend with shekels to spend. On the wall is a poster of Palestinian icon Yasser Arafat, sporting, as always, a kaffiyeh. Is it one from the factory? "Yes," says Yasser Hirbawi. "Maybe," says his son more realistically.

As they show their visitors out, they shut down the one working loom and switch off the overhead light. It's lunchtime and perhaps production is over for the day.

Jouda Hirbawi insists the family will not give up its struggle to keep the factory going. "We will continue. This is the fruit of 50 years of continuous work – it's more than a business. We are trying to be competitive but we want to manufacture a high-quality kaffiyeh."

The family finds it hard to believe that the item they have been producing for almost half a century is in such global demand yet their business is on its knees.

"All over the world the kaffiyeh has become a symbol of resistance – even on protests that have nothing to do with the Palestinian people, you see people wearing them," says Jouda.

His father, weary and bitter, adds: "Everyone all over the world is benefiting from this symbol – except us."

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/02/last-kaffiyeh-factory-palestinian-territories

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Your Tax Dollars at Work: Israel to deport...well...just about the entire West Bank, apparently

In the most recent round of Kafka-esque absurdity from the U.S.-funded Israeli military, new military orders would allow the occupying army to deport anyone in the West Bank without an army-granted permit--which could include just about anyone


According to an editorial in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, "The order's vague language will allow army officers to exploit it arbitrarily to carry out mass expulsions, in accordance with military orders which were issued under unclear circumstances....This would be a grave and dangerous move, unprecedented during the Israeli occupation."

And The Guardian reports on efforts by Israeli human rights groups to combat this order:

"Israel's leading human rights groups are trying to stop two new Israeli military orders which will make any resident of the occupied West Bank who does not have an Israeli-issued permit liable for deportation or jail.
The new Order Regarding Prevention of Infiltration and Order Regarding Security Provisions, which comes into force on Tuesday have "severe ramifications," the rights groups say. Palestinians, and any foreigners living in the West Bank, could be labelled infiltrators and deported within 72 hours or jailed for seven years if they are found without the correct permit. It does not define what Israel considers a valid permit.

"The orders … are worded so broadly such as theoretically allowing the military to empty the West Bank of almost all its Palestinian inhabitants," said the 10 rights groups, which include Ha-Moked, B'Tselem, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, and Rabbis for Human Rights. Until now the vast majority of Palestinians in the West Bank have not been required to hold a permit just to be present in their homes, the groups say."


Meanwhile, deported American journalist Jared Malsin writes at Huffington Post that the recent Anat Kam/Uri Blau cover-up scandal, which involves an expose of Israeli assassination orders that violated even the country's own laws (much less international law regarding extrajudicial assassination), is the latest front in Israel's "crisis of legitimacy."

Crisis of legitimacy, indeed. Racist permit systems. Arbitrary deportation. Extrajudicial assassinations. There is nothing legitimate about any of it.

Find out how much money you and your community are spending to support this sort of absurdity, and what you can do to stop it, at AidtoIsrael.org

http://endtheoccupationblog.blogspot.com/2010/04/your-tax-dollars-at-work-israel-to.html



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Khaled Meshaal -Speaks about Palestine and Victory over Israel, MUST WATCH

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PCHR Condemns Israeli Attempts to Legitimize Crimes in Gaza and Sheild Perpetrators from Justice

On 22 April 2009, Israeli Military Authorities announced the conclusion of five internal investigations examining the conduct of Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) during the recent military offensive in the Gaza Strip. The investigations, supervised by IOF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, claimed that investigations found a very small number of incidents involving intelligence or operational errors, but that "throughout the fighting in the Gaza Strip" IOF "operated in accordance with international law".

Deputy IOF chief of staff, Major General Dan Harel, claimed that 1,166 Palestinians were killed in the offensive of which 295 were civilians, and 709 were combatants. 162 victims have not been classified.

The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) strongly contest these figures and the results of the investigations, which constitute an attempt to legitimise crimes committed in the Gaza Strip, and to shield perpetrators from justice. PCHR's investigations indicate that 1,417 Palestinians were killed in the offensive, of which 1,181 (83%) were non-combatants. Civilian property in the Gaza Strip was also extensively targeted and destroyed: PCHR have found that, inter alia, approximately 20,000 homes and 1,500 factories and workshops were completely destroyed or damaged, and that 6,636 dunums of agricultural land were razed. Source



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